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Dennis L. Confer,1 Daniel Weisdorf,2 David Weinstock,3 Cullen Case,1 Nelson Chao4Bone marrow transplant (BMT) teams do not generally consider themselves to be emergency responders.
But the bone marrow is the most radiosensitive organ in the body, and early changes in peripheral blood
counts remain the best indicator of major total-body radiation exposures. Following a mass casualty incident,
such as that occasioned by a nuclear detonation, BMT teams should expect that they will be called upon for
their expertise in managing severe myelosuppression. Numerous resources, including the Radiation Injury
Treatment Network, are available to assist BMT teams in planning for such a role.
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Blood and Marrow TransplantationTHE THREAT
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
dramatically changed the trajectory of security initia-
tives in the United States. Far more impactful than
the domestic terrorism occasioned by the Oklahoma
City bombing in 1995, the coordinated 9/11 destruc-
tion of the World Trade Center Towers, the attack
on the Pentagon, and the loss of Flight 93, thrust the
United States into a defensive posture; a defensive
posture that focused upon external threats.
‘‘Nine-eleven’’ spawned the Transportation Safety
Administration, whose current $8.1 billion annual
budget exceeds that of the National Cancer Institute
by $3 billion, and the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity (DHS) with a $42 billion annual budget, nearly
twice that of the entire National Institutes of Health.
The DHS was created in 2002 with the mission to ‘‘se-
cure the nation from the many threats we face.’’ By
2005, the ‘‘National Planning Scenarios’’ document
was published by the Federal Government for ‘‘official
use only’’ [1]. This document details 15 potential
scenarios of major disasters including terrorist activi-
ties affecting the United States. The first scenario,
which consumes nearly a third of the 150-page
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Scenario 1 in the National Planning Scenarios
presents in lurid detail an all-but-inconceivable event
of mass destruction: 200,000, or more, immediate
deaths within the zone of total destruction and the
surrounding areas of ‘‘thermal,’’ ‘‘projectile,’’ and
‘‘translational’’ (thrown into an object of greater mass)
injuries, as well as hundreds of thousands of persons
with sublethal injuries and major radiation exposures.
A quarter of a million persons may be casualties of
pure radiation exposure, the result of radioactive fallout.
One fact, and 1 fact alone, renders the horrific
consequences of Scenario 1 conceivable; that is, it has
already happened. During the waning months of the
Second World War, the detonation of atomic bombs
over Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated in the
worst possible terms the destructive power of nuclear
weapons, each of which was approximately the same
10-kiloton size described in the scenario above.
If the incidentof Scenario1occurred, howwouldwe
respond?Certainly everymajor city in theUnited States
has developed disaster response plans. Although these
plans are often focused upon local disasters (eg, the
San Francisco earthquake of 1989 or the Minneapolis
bridge collapse of 2007), they canbe activated for distant
disasters; following Hurricane Katrina in 2005, thou-
sands of persons were evacuated for medical care in
unaffected regions of Louisiana, Texas, Arkansas, and
other states. It is worth noting that many hospitals
accepted victims even though there was no guarantee
that care would be reimbursed. Indeed, anecdotal re-
ports say that in many cases the costs of care were never
recovered. Still, the healthcare facilities responded.
THE REALITYOF THE UNREAL
The National Marrow Donor Program (NMDP)
and the American Society for Blood and MarrowS189
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recognition of a fundamental reality; in the aftermath
of the an IND detonation, transplant physicians and
their teams would be expected to direct care for
thousands of victims with pure radiation exposure.
Why is this true?
 The bone marrow is the single most radiosensitive
organ in primates
 Transplant teams routinely care for patients with
severe myelosuppression from radiation or from
chemotherapy
 Transplant teams are adept in caring for ‘‘treatment-
related’’ injuries in other organ systems, while
nurturing marrow recovery
 Transplant teams know when hematopoietic stem
cell support is required for salvage
The remarkable similarities between the transplant
process and the effects of whole-body radiation
exposure provide a compelling rationale for ensuring
that U.S. transplant teams are prepared for a contin-
gency response role.
Supported by the Office of Naval Research, the
NMDP and ASBMT established the Radiation Injury
Treatment Network (RITN) in 2006 to assist with the
medical and logistical aspects of the transplant com-
munity contingency planning and response to a mass
casualty incident. The RITN is managed by an execu-
tive committee that is cochaired by representatives
from ASBMT and the NMDP. Additionally, the
RITN has a Steering Committee whose membership
is comprised of transplant physicians from RITN cen-
ters and key partners from professional organizations
(eg, AABB and European Group for Blood and Mar-
row Transplantation, and federal agency staff).
The collaboration betweenNMDP and ASMBT is
formalized through a memorandum of understanding.
Additional, memorandum of understandings have
been secured with the Department of Health and
Human Services—Office of the Assistant Secretary
for Preparedness and Response (DHHS-ASPR), with
the American Association of Blood Banks, and the
New England Center for Emergency Preparedness.
The RITN Executive and Steering Committees have
received advice and support from numerous federal
agencies including the Office of Naval Research, the
Health Resources and Services Administration,
DHHS-ASPR, the Armed Forces Radiobiology
Research Institute, the National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases, the National Library of
Medicine—Radiation Emergency Medical Manage-
ment, and the White House National Security Staff.
Thehematopoietic syndrome is awell-documented
early complication of intense radiation exposure and
the acute radiation syndrome (ARS) [2]. Given the
early evidence of myelosuppression, there has been
continual interest in hematopoietic cell transplantation(HCT) as a therapeutic, potentially life-saving treat-
ment for radiation casualties. Themost extensive trans-
plant experience occurred following the Chernobyl
disaster more than 25 years ago. Although generally
regarded as having limited success, recently published
information suggests that some Chernobyl victims
benefited fromHCT support [3]. In 1999, 2 severely ir-
radiated industrial workers in Tokaimura, Japan, had
hematopoiesis fully restored following allogeneic
transplantation. One man received peripheral blood
stem cells from a sister, whereas the other received an
unrelated umbilical cord blood transplant. Both men
later succumbed to other injuries.
Currently, it is thought that, based on level of
exposure and other presenting injuries, victims from
a radiation exposure will generally fall into 1 of 4
categories:
 Some victims will recover without specialized
treatment
 Some will be so injured that death is a certainty from
damage to any 1 of several vital organs
 Some will recover provided they receive adequate
supportive care, for example, isolation, antibiotics,
transfusions, and hematopoietic growth factors
 A subset of patients will benefit from transplantation
In 2004, a subgroup of the Strategic National
Stockpile Program—The Acute Radiation Medical
Management Working Group (SNS Radiation Work-
ing Group)—developed a consensus opinion to pro-
vide guidance for estimation of radiation dose,
clinical assessment of exposed individuals, guidelines
for use of cytokines, and medical management [4].
This consensus document recognizes that both growth
factor therapy and HCT can play roles in the manage-
ment of the hematopoietic syndrome of ARS.PLANNING AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
The DHS is responsible for all risk assessment and
management. When it was created, 22 separate federal
departments were consolidated into the new structure.
Functions include transportation safety, border con-
trol, Immigration, Customs, the U.S. Coast Guard,
the Secret Service, and the Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency. Under the Federal Emergency Man-
agement Agency has been established the National
Response Framework [5], which includes the identifi-
cation of 15 Emergency Support Functions [6]. Emer-
gency Support Functions #8, identified as Public
Health Medical Services, is supported by numerous
agencies, but the primary lead and coordination role
rests with DHHS-ASPR [7]. Important resources
that have been created through DHHS-ASPR include
‘‘playbooks’’ for radiation emergencies and the Radia-
tion Emergency Medical Management (REMM)Web
resource [8].
Figure 1. A portion of a representative ‘‘Sit Rep’’distributed to the RITN centers in the days and weeks following onset of the Fukushima disaster. Note
the prominent indication of RITN activation status.
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Local Planners Playbook for Response to a Nuclear
Detonation [9]. The playbook builds on information
contained in an earlier publication, Planning Guid-
ance for Response to a Nuclear Detonation [10].
Both publications reference important roles for the
RITN.
The National Library of Medicine maintains
the REMM Website [8]. The REMM site provides
detailed information about the management of many
radiation exposure scenarios. It also provides links to
numerous publications and relevant peer-reviewed
articles. The entire Web content can be downloaded
to a computer or selected content downloaded to
a mobile device.
A recent federal initiative, the Nuclear Detonation
Scarce ResourcesWorking Group, addressed multiple
issues in the medical response to an IND detonation.
Articles addressing triage, allocation of resources,
altered standards of care, and other topics were
published in a supplement to Disaster Medicine and
Public Health Preparedness [11-17]. The full text for
each publication is available on the REMM Website.LESSONS LEARNED FROM FUKUSHIMA
On March 11, 2011, a massive earthquake of
magnitude 9.0 erupted offshore from Japan 230 miles
northeast of Tokyo. The tsunami that followed
destroyed a large swath of the Japanese coastline and
took the lives of nearly 20,000 people. The Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, surrounded by
a 33-foot seawall, resisted the first wave of the tsunami,
but a second wave nearly 50 feet tall topped the wall.
The wave flooded the 6 boiling water reactors of
Fukushima destroying low-lying control equipment
and emergency generators. Stripped of all electrical
power for cooling and control, the reactors overheated
and nuclear cores melted down. Explosions of hydro-
gen gas destroyed reactor buildings and ignited fires.
Spent fuel rods stored in open pools were exposed
when water levels could not be maintained. Fukushima
became the worst nuclear disaster since Chernobyl.
Despite the disaster, major human radiation expo-
sures at Fukushima have been limited. Certainly many
workers have been exposed to doses exceeding the
usual industry limits, but no exposures sufficient to
S192 Biol Blood Marrow Transplant 18:S189-S192, 2012D. L. Confer et al.cause ARS or myelosuppression have been reported.
Nevertheless, in the weeks that followed, a group of
experienced hematologists in Japan proposed that
hematopoietic progenitor cells should be collected
prophylactically from some or all at-risk workers
[18]. There are many issues surrounding such
a proposal concerning feasibility, utility, safety and
cost-effectiveness. Some of these were discussed in
detail by the RITN executive committee in a letter
to the editor [19].
RITN responded to the evolving Fukushima
incident by providing a daily e-mail ‘‘Sit Rep’’ to the
network centers (Figure 1). Each report presented
current information on the status of the disaster,
including publicly available information from the
World Health Organization and updates gleaned
from multiple other sources. Each Sit Rep also
prominently indicated the level of RITN activation
(there was never any activation of the RITN) and
reported on communications with DHHS-ASPR.
The effect of the Sit Reps was to keep the network
informed on a real-time basis and to provide realistic
information about the likelihood of RITN activation,
which remained very low throughout the evolution
of the Fukushima disaster.
CONCLUSIONS
Radiation incidents and frank disasters continue to
occur. Although the economic and public health im-
pacts can be massive, they have remained comparable
to natural disasters, such as hurricanes and earth-
quakes. Detonation of a nuclear bomb, however,
whether a weapon or an IND, would cause destruction
and carnage that is unimaginable. The RITN works to
educate transplant teams about the risks of a mass
casualty incident and to assist in planning for a role
in caring for radiation exposure victims.
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